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n its 1998 decision in State Street Bank and
Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit (which now hears all
patent appeals in this country) addressed
“the judicially-created, so-called ‘business
method’ exception to statutory subject matter”
(149 F. 3d 1368, 1375 [Fed. Cir. 1998], cert. denied,
525 U.S. 1093 [1999]). Throughout most of the history of American patent law, the courts and the
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) had
usually—but not uniformly—denied patents to
inventions that amounted to nothing more than
methods for doing business. In State Street, the
Federal Circuit repudiated this long-standing
practice in terms that could not have been blunter:
“We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest. . . . Since the 1952 Patent Act,
business methods have been, and should have
been, subject to the same legal requirements for
patentability as applied to any other process or
method” (State Street, 1375).
In the same decision, the Federal Circuit also
repudiated the notion that computer-based inventions should be subject to special restrictions.
Sweeping away three decades of complex and often
inconsistent case law, the court held that a computerized process for transforming data is within the
realm of patentable subject matter so long as it
“produces a ‘useful, concrete and tangible result’ ”

I

(p. 1375). Whereas patent lawyers had previously
felt it necessary to hide the computerized aspects of
their patent claims in a conventionally patentable
machine or process, State Street made it possible to
bring software into the open.
Because contemporary business, particularly in
the financial services area, is almost entirely dependent upon computers for its design and implementation, the interrelationship of the two State Street
holdings is self-evident. Under previous law, it was
widely believed that one could not patent either a
pure business method or a pure software operation
(that is, one that did not produce effects in the
physical world). State Street allowed both, reversing the lower court’s invalidation of a patent claiming the computerized implementation of a method
of providing financial services. The broadest claim
in the patent was drawn to “a data processing system for managing a financial services configuration
of a portfolio established as a partnership, each
partner being one of a plurality of funds,” to be
implemented by a generic system of hardware and
software (p. 1371).
The State Street decision is perceived to have
sparked a revolution in both law and business. One
widely held view is that State Street made everything
patentable in the business world and that business
people are responding by trying to patent everything
(Meurer, forthcoming). That may be something of an
overstatement. Although business method patents

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta E C O N O M I C R E V I E W Fourth Quarter 2003

15

were relatively uncommon before State Street,
patent lawyers had found ways to obtain them and,
on occasion, had successfully defended them in the
courts (Kuester and Thompson 2001). Moreover,
while State Street certainly led to an increase in the
volume of business patent applications (Meurer,
forthcoming), it has not been quite the flood that
has been claimed. In addition, there is every possibility that here, as in other areas, what the Federal
Circuit has given by expanding the standards for
patentability it will take away by tightening the
standards for enforcement.
Nonetheless, one cannot deny the extraordinary
influence of the State Street decision, both legally
and practically. If it did not quite revolutionize the
law, it refined and restated it with absolute clarity.
If nothing else, the publicity surrounding the State
Street case in the legal and business worlds has created near-universal awareness of the existence and
potential significance of business method patents.
This paper reviews the state of the law with
respect to business method patents, both in the
United States and internationally. It begins with
a brief overview of the basic requirements for
patentability in the United States and internationally.
It presents in some detail the evolution and current
state of American law and international law, focusing
on the European Union, examples of European
national law, and Japan. Finally, the paper analyzes
legal trends both in the United States and abroad,
makes concluding comparative comments, and offers
some predictions about unfolding legal issues.

Basics of Patent Law
o meet the basic requirements for obtaining a
patent under American law, an invention must
pass four tests:
First, under Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952
(35 U.S.C. §§ 100 et seq.), the patent application must
claim so-called statutory subject matter. That is, it
must claim a human-made process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or an improvement
thereon. Laws of nature, products of nature, and
abstract ideas such as mathematical algorithms have
historically been deemed nonstatutory (Diamond v.
Chakrabavty, 447 U.S. 303 [1980]).
Second, the claimed invention must be novel.
Novelty has a highly technical meaning, which is
articulated in the complex provisions of Section 102
of the Patent Act. For example, under Section
102(a), the patent will be denied if the invention
was known or used by others in this country,
patented here or abroad, or described in a “printed
publication” in the United States or a foreign coun-

T
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try prior to the patent applicant’s date of invention.
Section 102(b) creates the “statutory bar” that
results in a forfeiture of patent rights if the applicant or anyone else makes public use of the invention, puts it on sale, or engages in other specified
conduct for more than a year prior to the filing of an
application. Section 102(g) establishes the rules for
determining priority when two or more inventors
claim the same invention. American priority rules
are virtually unique in international patent law:
Priority is awarded to the person who can prove
that he or she was the first to invent whereas in
most other countries the patent goes to the first
person to file a patent application.
The third requirement is utility. Although Section
101 requires that an invention be “useful,” utility has
no specific statutory definition, so its meaning is
derived from case law. In the vast majority of
instances, it is an easy standard to meet, requiring
nothing more than a showing that the invention
may be put to some beneficial (very broadly construed) use. Historically, chemistry has been the one
area in which significant numbers of applications
have been denied for lack of utility. In a 1966 case
called Brenner v. Manson (383 U.S. 519 [1966]),
for example, the Supreme Court denied a patent to
“a chemical process which yields an already known
product whose utility—other than as a possible
object of scientific inquiry—has not yet been evidenced” (p. 532). The compound in question was
closely related to a class of compounds that had
been shown to inhibit tumors in mice—an unquestioned showing of utility—but whose own potential
uses were not yet known. Following the same reasoning, the USPTO and the courts currently require that
claims to genetic sequences disclose their function;
it is not enough simply to state that the gene is an
object of scientific inquiry that is ultimately likely to
lead to beneficial medical applications.
The fourth and final requirement is nonobviousness. As set forth in Section 103(a) of the Patent Act,
the specific rule is that the invention is unpatentable
“if the differences between the subject matter sought
to be patented and the prior art are such that the
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious
at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which such subject
matter pertains.” The nonobviousness barrier will
often trip up applicants who have survived the novelty inquiry. Under the novelty test, the patent will
not be denied unless the very invention that is
claimed has been described, used, etc. in its entirety
before the critical date. Under the nonobviousness
rule, by contrast, the patent will be denied if a hypo-
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thetical person of ordinary skill in the field, armed
with the total knowledge in the field (the “prior
art”), would have looked at the applicant’s advance
at the time it was made and deemed it an obvious
step. As this description suggests, the nonobviousness requirement is highly subjective, and its application by the courts and the USPTO has been
inconsistent over the years.
Assuming that these four standards can be satisfied, the application itself must meet certain formal
requirements. The most important of these is Section
112’s “enabling disclosure” rule. The patent application must describe the invention with enough specificity to enable a person skilled in the relevant field
to make and use it. It is not necessary for the inventor actually to have built the invention (or in patent
jargon, reduced it to practice) before filing the application. It is enough that the description provided in
the application will enable someone else to build it
and that the patent examiner is persuaded that it is
indeed operable.
If a patent is granted, the inventor will be able to
stop others from making, using, or selling the invention for the term of the patent (17 U.S.C. § 271[a]). In
most cases, U.S. patents (as well as those in other
countries) last for twenty years from the date the
application is filed (35 U.S.C. § 154[a][2]). The words
“make, use, and sell” are taken in their literal senses.
The proscribed activities are strictly prohibited,
regardless of whether they involve intentional copying or accidental duplication. The Patent Act also prohibits importing patented inventions into the United
States from abroad (35 U.S.C. § 271[a]), as well as
actively inducing others to commit acts of infringement (35 U.S.C. § 271[b]). Other provisions define a
number of contributory infringements. These include
knowingly selling or offering to sell specialized components of patented inventions (35 U.S.C. § 271[c]).
U.S. patent laws, like most other national patent laws,
generally lack extraterritorial effect, meaning that
they do not cover most conduct outside the United
States. However, it is also infringement to supply a
specialized component of a patented invention from
the United States, knowing that such component will
be used abroad in a manner that would infringe the
patent if done within the United States (35 U.S.C. §
271[f]) or to import a product of a patented process
that is practiced abroad (35 U.S.C. § 271[f]).
Successful patent infringement plaintiffs may be
awarded injunctive relief, actual damages, and, in
exceptional cases, multiple damages as well as attorneys fees (35 U.S.C. §§ 283–85).
Under a recent amendment to the Patent Act
called the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999

(35 U.S.C. § 273), defendants accused of infringing
business method patents have some special defenses.
In general, it is a defense to an action for the infringement of a business method patent if the defendant,
acting in good faith, had reduced the patented invention to practice (actually built it) more than one year
before the plaintiff’s application was filed and had
used the invention commercially at any time before
the plaintiff’s filing. The defendant has the burden of
proof to establish this defense and may not use it if
he or she learned of the invention from the patent
holder. Moreover, the defense is purely personal, and
the defendant’s right to use the invention may not be
licensed or transferred to anyone else.

Whereas patent lawyers had previously felt it
necessary to hide the computerized aspects of
their patent claims in a conventionally
patentable machine or process, State Street
made it possible to bring software into the open.

The purpose of creating this new defense was to
address a problem that is believed to be endemic in
the business method patent area. At the time a
business method application is being reviewed, the
sources typically available to the patent examiner
(principally, prior patents and conventional publications) may not reveal that the claimed invention
was either not novel or obvious at the purported
date of invention. Nonetheless, evidence may later
emerge that others had been using the same technology well before the date of the application. For a
variety of technical reasons, this prior use might not
invalidate the patent. While these new provisions do
not change the standards for patentability, they
may prevent the patent holder from putting such
prior users out of business.
A final point is that U.S. patent law is perhaps
the most “back-end-loaded” in the world. The
United States, in other words, is relatively lenient
in granting patents, depending more heavily on
judicial scrutiny when patentees bring infringement actions (Kesan 2002). Most other countries
offer third parties a more meaningful opportunity
to oppose a patent while it is pending or immediately after it is issued (Merges and Duffy 2002,
64). The U.S. law of reexamination has the effect
of postponing most such challenges until the
patentee brings an infringement action (35 U.S.C.
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§§ 311–18).1 Although plaintiffs’ patents carry a
presumption of validity, defendants can—and regularly do—attempt to show that patents were
wrongly issued.
The substantive requirements for obtaining a
patent vary little from country to country. For example, under Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement
(Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, enacted under the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), all members of the
World Trade Organization are required to make
patents available “for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of technology, provided
that they are new, involve an inventive step and are
capable of industrial application.” An accompanying
footnote states, “The terms ‘inventive step’ and ‘capable of industrial application’ may be deemed by a
Member to be synonymous with the terms ‘nonobvious’ and ‘useful,’ respectively.” Similar standards have
long been followed by Japan, the European Patent
Office, and the individual member states of the
European Union. As will be discussed later, there are
material differences in patentability standards in
some subject matter areas, including business methods and biotechnology.

U.S. Legal Doctrine

H

istory. Despite the conventional view that
patents on methods of doing business have long
been disfavored, if not flatly prohibited, such patents
have, in fact, been regularly granted. For example,
the first financial services patent was probably granted to Jacob Perkins in 1789 for a system of detecting
counterfeit notes; unfortunately, its details were lost
in a fire in 1836 (USPTO 2000). In 1867 Charles L.
Hawkes of Titusville, Pennsylvania, obtained a patent
titled “Improvement in Hotel-Registers” (Letters
Patent No. 63,889). His “invention” was to add to the
margins of blank-ruled hotel register pages “advertisements of business houses, entertainments, railroad or steamboat cards, and other notices whose
insertion is worth paying for.” And in 1907 a patent
was issued to Eugene Graves Adams of Lynchburg,
Virginia, for an improved form for the accident insurance policies that were widely purchased by railway
travelers of the age (Letters Patent No. 853,852).
Adams claimed, “As an article of manufacture, a twopart insurance policy consisting of a paper containing
an insurance contract . . . combined with a postal
card, both bearing a number or mark of identification,
to be mailed to the beneficiary.”
Patents have regularly been granted on machines
and processes intended to make business more efficient. In 1815, for example, John Kneas obtained a
18

patent for an improvement in banknote printing
(USPTO 2000). His advance was “to print copper
plate on both sides of the note or bill, or copper plate
on one side and letter press on the other side, or letter press on both sides of a bank note or bill as an
additional security against counterfeiture.” In 1889
Herman Hollerith obtained method and apparatus
patents titled “Improvements in the Art and System of
Computing Statistics” (Letters Patent No. 395,781).
Hollerith’s patents described the mechanical punch
card system for processing business information that
dominated the market until the age of personal computers. Hollerith founded the Tabulating Machine
Company, whose name was changed to International
Business Machines Corporation in 1924 by Thomas
J. Watson Sr.
In spite of this history, the USPTO and most courts
long recognized a nearly absolute prohibition against
claims drawn to methods of doing business. The most
often cited case is Hotel Security Checking Co. v.
Lorraine Co., a 1908 decision of the Second Circuit
(160 F. 467 [2d Cir. 1908]). The patent in question
involved a hotel bookkeeping system that provided
for cash registering and account checking in a manner designed to prevent fraud. Although, as will be
seen, the Federal Circuit in State Street treated Hotel
Security as a case of novelty and nonobviousness
rather than as a subject matter case, the Second
Circuit did state that “a system of transacting business disconnected from the means for carrying out
the system is not . . . an art” (p. 469). By “art,” it
meant “process” as that term is currently used in
Section 101. This language was followed as settled
law by a number of cases extending through the
beginning of the computer age in the second half
of the twentieth century. In a 1942 case called In re
Patton, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals
(the Federal Circuit’s predecessor) reaffirmed the
Hotel Security doctrine by stating that a system for
transacting business, separate from the means for
carrying out that system, was not patentable subject
matter (127 F. 2d 423 [C.C.P.A. 1942]). The USPTO
followed the Hotel Security rule as well. Through
1996, Section 706.03(a) of the Manual of Patenting
Examining Procedures contained the following
statement: “Though seemingly within the category
of process or method, a method of doing business
can be rejected as not being within the statutory
classes” (citing Hotel Security Checking).2
The seemingly absolute rule of Hotel Security
began to erode in the 1960s and 1970s as computers
were increasingly used to perform business functions. Claims drawn to computer-related inventions
had a tortured history in the courts prior to State

Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta E C O N O M I C R E V I E W Fourth Quarter 2003

Street. Two Supreme Court decisions may have
contributed to the confusion. In its 1978 decision
in Parker v. Flook (437 U.S. 584 [1978]), the Court
rejected as nonstatutory a claim drawn to a method
for calculating an “alarm limit” for catalytic converters that was intended to be implemented on a computer. The essential problem, as the Court saw it,
was that the patent claimed nothing more than the
calculation of a mathematical formula. Three years
later, in Diamond v. Diehr, the Court upheld the
statutory status of a claim on “a method of operating a rubber molding press for precision-molded
compounds with the aid of a digital computer” (450
U.S. 175, 179 n.5 [1981]). The computer’s function
was the repetitive calculation of a well-known mathematical formula known as the Arrhenius equation.
The Court apparently saw a material distinction
between claiming an industrial process that happened to employ computer calculations and claiming the act of calculation itself as an aid to carrying
out an industrial process.
Before and after the two Supreme Court decisions, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
its successor, the Federal Circuit, struggled with
limited success to establish coherent rules for the
patentability of computer-based inventions. Many
cases focused on whether and under what circumstances the inevitable presence of mathematical
algorithms in computerized processes would defeat
the patent. Despite their inconsistency, these cases
seemed to establish that the use of a computer to
perform mathematical calculations would not in
itself defeat patentability if the calculations were
applied so as to affect or understand the physical
world (State Street, 1373–75; Chisum 2002, § 1.03[6]).
Accordingly, in 1992 the Federal Circuit upheld a
patent claiming methods and apparatus for the
computerized transformation of electrocardiograph
signals into a form that would give a doctor useful
diagnostic information (Arrhythmia Research
Technology, Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053
[Fed. Cir. 1992]).
Many patent lawyers drew a more straightforward
lesson from a comparison of Flook and Diehr: A
computer-based invention would survive statutory
subject matter scrutiny so long as the functions of
the computer were “hidden” in a familiar and otherwise patentable process or machine (Blumenthal and
Riter 1980). Thus, even before State Street, patent
drafters regularly obtained patents on processes that

happened to include the operation of a computer or
on machines that were nothing more than generalpurpose computers programmed to perform the
function in question (Merges and Duffy 2002, 151;
Kuester and Thompson 2001; USPTO 2000). Meansplus-function claims were especially popular. In such
claims, the function of a device is claimed and the
general means for performing the function are recited;
the specific structural features recited in the written
description portion of the patent are then read back
into the claims (35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶6). In its 1989 decision in In re Iwahashi, the Federal Circuit upheld a
claim in this form on “an autocorrelation unit for providing autocorrelation coefficients for use as feature

The publicity surrounding the State Street
case in the legal and business worlds has
created near-universal awareness of the
existence and potential significance of
business method patents.

parameters in pattern recognition”—in other words,
a device for implementing a mathematical algorithm
for voice recognition purposes (888 F.2d 1370 [Fed.
Cir. 1989]).
This growing tolerance of computer-based
inventions spilled over into the business method
area, leading to the allowance of a number of
patents on methods of doing business that were
implemented by computerized means (Chisum
2002, § 1.03[5]). In 1974, in In re Johnston (502
F.2d 765 [C.C.P.A. 1974]), the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals found that a patent drawn to
an automatic record-keeping system for a bank
constituted statutory subject matter. Perhaps significantly, the claim was on a machine—a digital
computer programmed to operate the system—
rather than on the process itself. Nine years later,
in Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, Inc. v.
Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. (564
F. Supp. 1358 [D. Del. 1983]), a federal district
court in Delaware rejected a subject matter challenge to a claim on a “securities brokerage-cash
management system.” The relevant claims, drafted
in means-plus-function form, were directed to

1. A third party who requests reexamination and loses may not challenge validity of the patent in subsequent infringement litigation “on any ground which the third-party requester raised or could have raised” in the reexamination (35 U.S.C. § 313[c]).
2. The manual and all other official publications of the USPTO are available on-line at its Web site, <www.uspto.gov>.
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computer hardware and software, designed and
programmed to implement a system whereby the
brokerage could manage all aspects of customer
accounts. Paine Webber, seeking a declaratory
judgment of noninfringement, attacked the patent
as claiming “nothing more than familiar business
systems, that is, the financial management of individual brokerage accounts” (p. 1365). Citing prior
decisions of the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals, the district court held that “the product
of a computer program is irrelevant, and the focus
of analysis should be on the operation of the program on the computer” (p. 1369). Therefore, it
concluded, the Merrill Lynch patent passed the

U.S. patent law is perhaps the most “backend-loaded” in the world. The United States
is relatively lenient in granting patents,
depending more heavily on judicial scrutiny
when patentees bring infringement actions.

statutory subject matter test as “a method of
operation on a computer to effectuate a business
activity” (p. 1369).
The USPTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences stated the evolving doctrine succinctly in
its 1988 decision in Ex Parte Murray: “Whereas an
apparatus or system capable of performing a business function may comprise patentable subject
matter, a method of doing business generated by
the apparatus or system is not” (9 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1819,
1820 [Bd. Pat. App. & Interf. 1988]). Murray held
that the “claimed accounting method, requiring no
more than the entering, sorting, debiting, and totaling of expenditures as necessary preliminary steps
to issuing an expense analysis statement, is, on its
very face, a vivid example of the type of ‘method of
doing business’ contemplated by our review court
[the Federal Circuit] as outside the protection of the
patent statutes” (p. 1820).
The distinction drawn by the board in Murray is
useful in explaining other post-computer but preState Street business method cases. For example,
in In re Maucorps (609 F. 2d 481 [C.C.P.A. 1979])
and In re Meyer (688 F.2d 789 [C.C.P.A. 1982]), the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals rejected as
nonstatutory claims drawn, respectively, to a business methodology for deciding how salesmen should
best handle particular customers and a system for
20

aiding neurologists in diagnosing patients. Then, in
the 1994 case of In re Schrader, the board denied
statutory status to a claimed system of auction bidding and the Federal Circuit affirmed (22 F. 3d 290
[Fed. Cir. 1994]). While the board relied both on the
abstract mathematical algorithm and the business
method exceptions, the Federal Circuit’s majority
opinion focused only on the former. In a significant
dissent, Judge Pauline Newman took the opportunity
to review the history of the business method doctrine and concluded that it “merits retirement from
the glossary of Section 101” (pp. 296–98). She distinguished a number of often-cited business method
cases (including Hotel Security) as being better
analyzed as novelty or nonobviousness cases. She
argued that “historical distinctions between a method
of ‘doing’ business and the means of carrying it out
blur in the complexity of modern business systems”
(p. 298), thus rejecting the analysis suggested by
Murray. She also quoted the Delaware district
court’s Merrill Lynch opinion approvingly and at
length. As will be seen in the next section, Judge
Newman’s conclusion and reasoning were to be
adopted almost unchanged in State Street.
A final development was the USPTO’s deletion
of the business method prohibition from the Manual
of Patent Examining Procedures in 1996. Simultaneously, the following language was added to the
1996 edition of the Examination Guidelines for
Computer-Related Inventions: “Office personnel
have had difficulty in properly treating claims directed
to methods of doing business. Claims should not be
categorized as methods of doing business. Instead,
such claims should be treated like any other process claims” (61 Fed. Reg. 7478, 7479 [1996]). The
USPTO’s more explicitly flexible attitude was quickly
reflected in its examination results. The late 1990s
saw the issuance of a significant number of patents
on what appeared to be standard business practices
conducted on the Internet (Oxford IPRC 2000,
17–18; Meurer, forthcoming, 6).
The state of American law with respect to business method patents immediately prior to the State
Street decision can be summarized as follows: To
the extent there had ever been an absolute bar on
patenting methods of doing business, it had all but
disappeared. Filings in the USPTO were becoming
more numerous and more aggressive. The USPTO
itself had moved from intransigence to flexibility to
what some regarded as abject surrender in the face
of such filings. The courts, meanwhile, were not
always consistent but were, on balance, increasingly
accommodating. Drawing on the proliferating case
law concerning computer-based inventions, some
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courts attempted to draw distinctions between claims
to pure business methods, which remained nonstatutory, and claims to otherwise patentable machines
and systems (programmed computers, in both cases,
whose purpose was to implement business methods).
One final point to be emphasized is that these
legal controversies focused on the question of statutory subject matter status. The novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness inquiries were always (at least in
theory) conducted in exactly the same way as they
were with respect to any other kind of invention.
The State Street and AT&T Decisions. The
State Street case involved a patent (U.S. Pat. No.
5,193,056) that had been issued to Signature
Financial Group, Inc., in 1993, titled “Data Processing
System for Hub and Spoke Financial Services
Configuration” (p. 1370). State Street, like Signature,
is in the business “of acting as custodians and
accounting agents for multi-tiered partnership fund
financial services” (p. 1370). When State Street was
unable to negotiate a license to use the Signature
patent, it filed suit, seeking a declaratory judgment of
invalidity and noninfringement. The Massachusetts
district court granted summary judgment for State
Street on the issue of invalidity, and the Federal
Circuit ultimately reversed.
More specifically, the patented invention allows
for the unified management of a portfolio set up as
a partnership, with each partner being a separate
mutual fund. The portfolio is characterized as the
“hub” and the constituent funds as “spokes.” The
“system provides means for a daily allocation of
assets for two or more Spokes that are invested in
the same Hub” (p. 1371). It “determines the percentage share that each Spoke maintains in the
Hub, while taking into consideration daily changes
both in the value of the Hub’s investment securities and in the concomitant amount of each
Spoke’s assets” (p. 1371). The system allocates the
hub’s daily income, expenses, and net realized and
unrealized gains or losses among the constituent
spokes. This allocation allows for the calculation of
the true asset value of each spoke on a daily basis
as well as for the year-end aggregation of income,
expenses, and capital gain or loss. Because each
spoke is a mutual fund selling shares to the public,
it is essential for pricing purposes that it has realtime data based on its percentage interest in the
hub portfolio.

Signature’s application, filed in 1991, initially
contained six machine claims in means-plus-function
form as well as six method claims. Signature cancelled the method claims in response to the patent
examiner’s opposition, and the six means-plusfunction claims were ultimately allowed. The only
independent claim,3 claim 1, recited “a data processing system for managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership,
each partner being one of a plurality of funds, comprising” a variety of computer hardware and software means (p. 1371). The district court treated
this and the other five claims as process claims and
rejected them because the mathematical algorithm
that they included was not “applied to or limited by
physical elements or process steps” (927 F. Supp.
508, 513 [D. Mass. 1996]). Drawing on the pre-State
Street case law, the district court concluded, not
unreasonably, that the patent claimed an abstract
mathematical calculation that was not adequately
tied to the physical world. The district court also
observed that its decision “comports with another
doctrinal exclusion from subject matter patentability
known as the ‘business methods exception’” (p. 515).
It cited numerous treatises and cases for the continuing validity of the doctrine and, in particular, for
the developing distinction between an apparatus or
a system capable of performing a business function
and that function itself.
The Federal Circuit thoroughly repudiated both
aspects of the district court’s decision. Initially, it
observed that the claims were properly viewed as
being in machine rather than process form, although
the distinction would ultimately prove immaterial.
It then significantly narrowed the mathematical
algorithm exception to patentability, thereby clarifying and simplifying the law of computer-related
patents. Citing the Supreme Court’s 1981 decision in
Diamond v. Diehr (discussed above), the Federal
Circuit acknowledged “that mathematical algorithms
are not patentable subject matter to the extent that
they are merely abstract ideas” (p. 1373). The court
went on, however, to redefine radically what is
meant by “abstract.” Specifically, “to be patentable, an
algorithm must be applied in a ‘useful’ way” (p. 1373).
On the facts before it, the court held “that the
transformation of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine through a series of
mathematical calculations into a final share price,

3. An independent claim, as the word suggests, stands alone and is interpreted without reference to any others. A dependent
claim incorporates the claim on which it depends and then adds further limitations. An independent claim might, for example, recite a chemical process, and a subsequent dependent claim could incorporate the first claim but then require that it be
carried out in a specified pH range.
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constitutes a practical application of a mathematical algorithm, formula or calculation, because it
produces a ‘useful, concrete, and tangible’ result—
a final share price momentarily fixed for recording
and reporting purposes” (p. 1373). It repudiated a
prior test (the so-called Freeman-Walter-Abele test)
that focused on the application of algorithms to
physical elements as having “little, if any, applicability to determining the presence of statutory subject
matter” (p. 1374). Henceforth, the only test is
whether computation of the algorithm yields a useful, concrete, and tangible result. A dollar number
that will be of use in the financial services industry
constitutes such a result.

State Street greatly simplified the law.…
A computer-based invention now constitutes
patentable subject matter so long as the computer operation produces a specific and useful result even if that result is simply a number.

The court then turned to the business method
exception and disposed of it succinctly and summarily: “We take this opportunity to lay this ill-conceived
exception to rest” (p. 1375). The exception should
not have survived the 1952 Patent Act’s all-inclusive
definition of statutory subject matter. Tracking Judge
Newman’s dissent four years earlier in Schrader,
the court expressed doubt that the doctrine had ever
been as robust as generally assumed. Analyzing its
own precedent, as well as that of the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals, the court noted that
“[a]pplication of this particular exception has always
been preceded by a ruling based on some clearer
concept” (p. 1375). Even Hotel Security, the court
found, again following Judge Newman, was really a
novelty and nonobviousness case. Finally, the court
also endorsed the proposition that the purported
distinction between a method of doing business per
se and the means of implementing that method was
far too fuzzy to be of any ongoing utility. Therefore,
the court concluded, “Whether the claims are directed
to subject matter within Section 101 should not turn
on whether the claimed subject matter does ‘business’ instead of something else” (p. 1377).
In summary, in a factual context that reflects the
inseparability of computer technology and modern
financial services, the Federal Circuit significantly
enhanced the patentability of both business meth22

ods and computer-based inventions generally. With
respect to the former, it dismissed as irrelevant the
characterization of a patent claim as drawn to a
method of doing business. With respect to the latter,
it cut through a convoluted case law to hold that
computer systems implementing mathematical
algorithms can constitute statutory subject matter
so long as they produce a useful, concrete, and tangible result. Finally, and perhaps most significantly,
it bridged the two legal points by holding that a set
of numbers of use to the financial services community constitutes precisely such a result.
A year later, the Federal Circuit decided AT&T
Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc. (172 F.3d
1352 [Fed. Cir. 1999]). The invention in that case
involved a system for creating message records for
long-distance telephone calls. Whereas the patent
in State Street was characterized as a means-plusfunction machine claim, AT&T’s patent contained ten
method claims. A Delaware federal district court
had held the patent invalid under Section 101 for
want of statutory subject matter. The Federal Circuit
reversed that decision.
AT&T did not directly involve the business method
exception, but it is relevant to the topic as a reaffirmation of State Street’s impact on computer-based
inventions. The district court recognized that the
claimed method required the use of computers and
switches. The court held the method nonstatutory,
however, on the grounds that it involved nothing
more than the operation of a mathematical algorithm
without any physical steps. The algorithm in question
was basic Boolean algebra.
In reversing the decision, the Federal Circuit
focused on the variable being calculated, “the PIC
indicator value.” The PIC indicator value provides a
record of a customer’s primary long-distance service carrier. Therefore, in the telephone business it
is “a useful, non-abstract result that facilitates differential billing of long-distance calls” (p. 1358).
Just like the financial data produced by the system
in State Street, the production of a PIC indicator
value was a sufficiently useful, concrete, and tangible application of the Boolean algorithm as to “fall
comfortably within the broad scope of patentable
subject matter under Section 101” (p. 1361).
AT&T v. Excel put to rest any concern that the
State Street court did not mean what it said about
the patentability of computer-based inventions. Once
again, a process that does not produce an effect in
the physical world has been held nonetheless to be
“useful, concrete and tangible.” In other words, “tangible” really means “specific.” Combined with the
demise of the business method barrier, this holding
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means that any computer-based invention that performs a business or financial operation should be
patentable subject matter. In every case, of course,
the other standards of patentability—novelty, utility,
and nonobviousness—will still have to be satisfied.
AT&T illustrates this latter point: on remand to consider these other factors, the district court invalidated the patent on novelty and obviousness grounds
(1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17871 [D. Del. 1999]).
Subsequent Developments. The state of the
law can be categorized as stable. Perhaps the most
closely watched case has been Amazon.com v.
barnesandnoble.com (239 F.3d 1343 [Fed. Cir.
2001]). Amazon.com sued for infringement of its
patent on a “method and system for placing a purchase order via a communications network” (U.S.
Pat. No. 5,960,411). The claims, which were drafted
with great breadth, cover one-click on-line shopping, both with and without the use of a shopping
basket. Amazon filed the suit in its hometown district
court in the state of Washington and was granted
a preliminary injunction on December 1, 1999. The
award of a preliminary injunction requires a finding
that the plaintiff has a probability of success on the
merits. The district court was therefore required to
find that Amazon would probably succeed on the
issue of patent validity. The Federal Circuit vacated
this injunction in 2001, expressing doubts about
Amazon’s ability to defend the validity of the patent.
Significantly, these doubts arose under Sections 102
and 103—not 101. Therefore, one should not read
into this decision any doubts about the State Street
and AT&T decisions. The case was settled on undisclosed terms before the district court rendered a
final decision on the merits (Merges and Duffy
2002, 1052).
Summary. The State Street case has officially
killed off whatever was left of the outright subject
matter ban on patenting methods of doing business. Indeed, such patents are no longer even in
the disfavored category. Simultaneously, State Street
greatly simplified the law with respect to computerbased inventions. A computer-based invention now
constitutes patentable subject matter so long as
the computer operation produces a specific and
useful result even if that result is simply in the
form of a number.

State of International Legal Doctrine

E

urope. This section will deal with two topics:
legal developments concerning business method

patents in Europe as a whole and related developments in individual European countries.
Business methods and “European” patents.
The first and perhaps most significant point to be
made is that there is at present no such thing as a
true European patent (Merges and Duffy 2002,
55–56; Taketa 2002, 962–64). There are currently
three ways to obtain a patent in Europe: proceeding through (1) the European Patent Office in
Munich, (2) individual national patent offices, and
(3) the Patent Cooperation Treaty. Since the Patent
Cooperation Treaty is a procedural agreement
intended primarily to assist countries with limited
resources in processing applications, it will not be
discussed further here.
The European Patent Office (EPO) was established in 1973 under the European Patent Convention
(EPC).4 The EPO is a hybrid organization with both
procedural and substantive functions. Although all
European Union members are signatories to the
EPC, the EPO is an intergovernmental rather than
EU body. An applicant files a single application with
the EPO, designating the particular EPC countries
in which patent protection is sought. The EPO then
conducts a single examination of the application
under unitary patentability standards established
by the EPC. What is issued, however, is not a true
European patent but a bundle of national patents.
(An ongoing EU effort to develop a unitary European
patent is discussed below.) Significantly, a patent
holder is required to file infringement actions in the
national courts of the countries in which infringement is alleged. This requirement is, of course,
expensive and inefficient—in contrast to the situation of a U.S. patent holder whose single federal
patent, enforceable in the federal courts, covers the
entire United States. Moreover, although the enforcing European courts theoretically apply the same
law, there is a substantial risk of variable interpretations. Again, this situation is in contrast with that
in the United States, where all patent appeals go
to the Federal Circuit.
The general EPC standards for patentable subject matter do not differ substantially from their
American counterparts. Under Article 52(1) of the
EPC, “European patents shall be granted for any
inventions which are susceptible of industrial application, which are new and which involve an inventive step.” These three requirements are generally
viewed as equivalent to the American criteria of
utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.

4. For general information on the EPO and the EPC, see the EPO’s Web site at <www.european-patent-office.org/epogeneral.htm>. The text of the EPC is available at the same site at <www.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/index.html>.
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The specific standards governing business
method patents show similarities and differences
when compared to the American rules. Article 52(2)
contains a number of specific exclusions, including
“schemes, rules and methods for performing mental
acts, playing games or doing business, and programs
for computers.” This apparently explicit prohibition
against patenting either computer programs or methods for doing business is not nearly so absolute as it
appears, however. The next section, Article 52(3),
states that “the provisions of paragraph 2 shall
exclude patentability of the subject matter or activities referred to in that provision only to the extent
to which a European patent application or European

The holy grail of “technical character” seems
little more than a challenge to European claim
drafters.… Business methods will be found to
be patentable subject matter, if not through
the front door then through the back.

The current Guidelines for Examination in the
EPO reinforce these principles.5 Under the heading
“Schemes, Rules and Methods for Performing
Mental Acts, Playing Games, or Doing Business,” the
guidelines state:
These are further examples of items of an
abstract or intellectual character. In particular, . . .
a scheme for organizing a commercial operation
would not be patentable. However, if the claimed
subject matter specifies an apparatus or technical
process for carrying out at least some part of the
scheme, that scheme and the apparatus or
process have to be examined as a whole. In particular, if the claim specifies computers, computer
networks or other conventional programmable
apparatus, or a program therefor, for carrying out
at least some steps of a scheme, it is to be examined as a “computer-implemented invention.”

The next section, “Programs for Computers,”
summarizes the relevant doctrine as follows:
When considering whether a claimed computerimplemented invention is patentable, the following is to be borne in mind. In the case of a
method, specifying technical means for a purely
nontechnical purpose and/or for processing
purely nontechnical information does not necessarily confer technical character on any such
individual step of or use on the method as a
whole. On the other hand, a computer system
suitably programmed for use in a particular field,
even if that is, for example, the field of business
and economy, has the character of a concrete
apparatus, in the sense of a physical entity or
product, and thus is an invention within the
meaning of Article 52(1).

patent relates to such subject matter or activities as
such” (emphasis supplied).
According to an official EPO press release on
business methods and computer programs, the
phrase “as such” is critical:
It follows that, although methods for doing business, programs for computers, etc. are as such
explicitly excluded from patentability, a product
or a method which is of a technical character
may be patentable, even if the claimed subject
matter defines or at least involves a business
method, a computer program, etc. (EPO 2000)

The same section states elsewhere:
The recent EU Commission document proposing
a directive on computer-implemented inventions
(discussed below) makes two related points (Comm.
of the EC 2002, 7–8). First, “an algorithm which is
considered as a theoretical entity in isolation from the
context of a physical environment, and in respect of
which it is accordingly not possible to infer its effects,
will be inherently non-technical and thus not susceptible of being regarded as a patentable invention.”
However, the second point—“all programs when run
in a computer are by definition technical”—virtually
moots the first. An algorithm apparently becomes
“technical,” and thus potentially patentable, so long
as it is implemented on a computer.
24

[Computer-implemented invention] claims may,
e.g., take the form of a method of operating said
conventional apparatus, the apparatus set up to
execute the method, or following [a decision of
the EPO Boards of Appeal], the program itself.
Insofar as the scheme for examination is concerned, no distinctions are made on the basis of
the overall purpose of the invention, i.e.,
whether it is intended to fill a business niche, to
provide some new entertainment, etc.

It is difficult to distinguish these principles in
material ways from the current state of U.S. law. First,
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as State Street did, the EPO Guidelines make it clear
that a claim directed to carrying out a business
method is not for that reason barred or even disfavored. Second, claims on computer-implemented
inventions generally are also neither barred nor disfavored. Third, such claims may be drafted either in
apparatus (machine) or in process form, specifying
computers, computer networks, or even software
(recall that State Street involved a machine claim,
whereas the patent in AT&T claimed a method or
a process). Fourth, an algorithm “as a theoretical
entity in isolation” is not a patentable invention, a rule
not materially different from State Street’s requirement that a claimed algorithm must be tied to a useful, concrete, and tangible result. In each of these
respects, the EPO position seems wholly consistent
with the doctrine of State Street and AT&T. To the
extent that there is a difference, it is that the EPO,
with its “as such” doctrine, is insisting on the distinction, drawn in the now-repudiated Murray case,
between “an apparatus or system capable of performing a business function . . . [and] a method of doing
business generated by the apparatus or system.”
A fifth aspect of the EPO subject matter requirements, the so-called technicality or technicity standard, is ostensibly distinguishable from the U.S.
standards but is likely to yield functionally similar
results in many cases (EU 2001). Under the EPO
Guidelines for “Programs for Computers,” the
claimed invention must have “technical character.”
This requirement is satisfied if “technical considerations are required to carry out the invention,” and
such technical considerations must be reflected in
the claims. A technical consideration will be found,
however, in the case of “a computer system suitably
programmed for use in a particular field, even if that
is, for example, the field of business and economy.”
This is to be contrasted with “a method, specifying
technical means for a purely nontechnical purpose,”
which would not be patentable. Putting these various principles together, it appears that the technical character requirement will be satisfied by any
computer, computer network, or computer program
that is developed or improved to yield a specific
result in a particular practical field of endeavor.
Although State Street and AT&T do not contain
similar language, they achieve a similar effect. Their
principal holdings are (1) that the mathematical
algorithms embodied in computer programs do not
bar patentability so long as their use produces a
useful, concrete, and tangible result and (2) that

the production of specific business or financial data
satisfies that criterion. Thus, although worded differently, the U.S. and EPO subject matter standards
seem to be functionally similar.
The EPO Guidelines are derived from the case
law of the EPO Boards of Appeal. Perhaps the most
important of its business method decisions is the
Sohei case (T 769/92, 1995 OJ EPO 525 [1994]),6
which is cited in the Guidelines and has been widely
discussed in the European literature (Oxford IPRC
2000, 35). In Sohei, the applicant claimed “a computer system for plural types of independent management including at least financial and inventory
management” and a method for operating said system. Data could be input using a single “transfer
slip,” which could take the form of an image displayed
on a computer screen. The board held that the
claimed subject matter constituted an invention under
Article 52(1) of the EPC and could not be excluded
from patentability under Articles 52(2)(c) and (3).
Consistent with the U.S. practice of treating
patentable subject matter as an initial inquiry
independent of novelty and nonobviousness, the
appellant Sohei argued that “technicality . . . of an
invention should, in principle, be examined independently of the question of novelty and inventive
step.” The board apparently agreed, “remitting”
the case to the EPO’s Examining Division for further consideration of the questions of novelty and
inventive step. Sohei then argued that a computerized invention such as that claimed could not be
held unpatentable under Article 52 as a program
for a computer “as such”:
Whenever a computerized solution of a problem
involves an implementation which is different
from how a human being would solve the problem manually or mentally, technicality in the
above sense should be assumed. As to computer
programs, Article 52(2)(c) was only intended to
exclude program listings.

Although the board did not endorse so broad a
proposition, it did find in Sohei’s favor. The claimed
invention embodied adequate technicality because
“the file handling needs a knowledge of the capacities
of the computer on which the respective program is
to be run.” The claim in question was really directed
to the operation of the computer system, which is
technical; the financial and inventory management
systems, which are not technical, were held to be

5. The guidelines are available at the EPO’s Web site, <www.european-patent-office.org/legal/gui_lines/e/c_iv_2.htm>.
6. The EPO Boards of Appeal decisions are available at the EPO Web site at <legal.European-patent-office.org/dg3/search_dg3.htm>.
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tangible illustrations of the operation of the system
and perhaps “a voluntary limitation of the scope of
protection.” Their mention, however, did not undercut the technicality of the invention. Finally, the fact
that the computer system was to be used to implement business methods that might be unpatentable
“as such” did not render the system itself unpatentable: “Against claims so generalized in the Board’s
view, no objection that they relate only to ‘doing business’ as such could be raised.” As the Oxford
Intellectual Property Research Centre has put it, “the
Board attached no importance to the end use of the
system” (2000, 35). The bottom line is that, despite
apparently more complex and demanding require-

Japanese law and practice with respect to
both software and business method patents
are usually described as being similar to the
EPO’s, with both standing in contrast to the
American situation.

ments, a computerized system for solving a pure business problem constitutes patentable subject matter
under the European Patent Convention almost to the
same extent as under the State Street regime.
A more recent board decision underlines the
importance of claim drafting to the determination of
whether a business method constitutes patentable
subject matter. The Pension Benefits Systems
Partnership (TT 931/95 [2000]) case involved two
primary claims: the first drawn to “a method of controlling a pension benefits program” that involves
various unspecified “data processing means” and
“computing means” and the second claiming “an
apparatus for controlling a pension benefits system”
that involves “data processing means.” (Interestingly,
the applicant is an American company.) The board
held that the first claim “does not go beyond a
method of doing business as such, and therefore, is
excluded from patentability under Article 52(2)(c)
in combination with Article 52(3) EPC; the claim
does not define an invention within the meaning of
Article 52(1).” The board rejected the argument
that the references to data processing and computing means “conferred technical character to the
method claimed,” finding instead that the method
amounted “to no more than the general teaching to
use data processing means for processing or providing information of purely administrative, actuar26

ial and/or financial character.” The apparatus claim,
however, was upheld as “constituting a physical
entity or concrete product suitable for performing
or supporting an economic activity.”
These sorts of distinctions are insubstantial, if
not illusory. The doctrine that emerges resembles
the muddle that characterized U.S. case law before
State Street. The holy grail of “technical character”
seems little more than a challenge to European
claim drafters.7 There is no reason to doubt that,
like their American counterparts, they will be up to
it. Business methods will be found to be patentable
subject matter, if not through the front door then
through the back.
A more substantial distinction appears to lie in
the EPO’s application of the inventive step (nonobviousness) requirement to business method and
computer-related inventions. The EPO requires that
the inventive step be in a technical area; thus, an
obvious computer implementation of a nonobvious
business method will fail. In a consultation paper prepared to guide discussion on the proposed Directive
on Computer-Implemented Inventions, the EU
technical staff emphasized that “[t]he fact that the
technical contribution also has to be non-obvious
is an important limitation on the patentability of
computer-implemented inventions” (Comm. of the
EC 2000, 4). State Street does not appear to contemplate such a limitation.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that EPO examination practice is significantly more onerous than that
in the USPTO. The examination process begins with
the presumption that business methods are not per
se unpatentable. The examiner next looks for an
inventive step; to satisfy this criterion the invention
must solve a technical problem. However, “if implementation of a business method calls for solution of
a technical problem, it will pass muster”; “the overall purpose of the invention is not considered material” (Oxford IPRC 2000, 36). A conventional novelty
inquiry follows.
With respect to software-based inventions generally, the president of the EPO stated in 1998 that,
“Far from being antisoftware, we have been at pains
to ensure that the European Patent system remains
fully in tune with the needs of the software industry. . . . The EPO’s approach to software-related
inventions has been liberal” (Oxford IPRC 2000, 39).
The ultimate question is whether this liberality will
extend to software-based business method inventions. Perhaps spurred by the Sohei decision, EPO
business method applications have risen substantially
in the last few years (the vast majority are still pending) although the volume is as yet nowhere near
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what it has been in the United States (pp. 40–41).
This lag may be due to real differences in legal requirements for patenting. It is equally plausible, however,
that the disparity results from late-developing
awareness among European companies of the availability of business method patents. Indeed, a recent
Oxford IPRC survey indicates that most EPO business method filings are made by U.S. nationals (p. 41,
app. B). According to the same survey, it remains too
early to discern whether the EPO will distinguish
itself from the USPTO in the handling of business
method applications.
European national laws. The national law with
respect to computer-implemented inventions in general, and business method inventions in particular, is
well developed only in the United Kingdom and
Germany. U.K. courts deal with the interpretation
and enforcement of U.K. patents issued by both the
U.K. Patent Office (UKPO) and the EPO. Although
the U.K. courts are not bound by the decisions of the
EPO Boards of Appeal, they are influenced by a parliamentary declaration of intention that patent laws
be uniform throughout the EU. Nonetheless, the
recent Oxford IPRC report concludes that “United
Kingdom courts approach the issue of excluded subject matter in a manner somewhat less favorable to
the patentee [than the EPO]” (2000, 37).
The critical difference may be that, whereas under
EPO law the ultimate objective is irrelevant to the
patentability of a computer system, a 1996 English
decision rejecting a patent on a program for designing chemical structures held that “the Court or
Patent Office must direct its attention not to the fact
that the program is controlling the computer but to
what the computer, so controlled, is doing” (Fujitsu
Ltd.’s Application [1996] RPC 511 [Pat. Ct.], aff’d
[1997] RPC 561 [Ct. App.]). This view is consistent
with the 1989 English Court of Appeal decision in
Merrill Lynch Inc.’s Application ([1989] RPC 561
[Ct. App.]), which held unpatentable a data processing system for buying and selling securities. In contrast to the approach taken by the EPO in Sohei, the
Merrill Lynch court held that, although a data processing system operating to produce a novel technical
result would normally be patentable, such a system
is unpatentable “if the result itself is a prohibited
item” such as a method of doing business. The UKPO

(2001) has recently reaffirmed its adherence to
these principles and its intent to do so for the foreseeable future.
German case law, by contrast, has been interpreted as “not exclud[ing] the possibility that business methods having a technical aspect could be
patentable, even if the only contribution that the
invention makes is nontechnical” (Comm. of the EC
2002, 10). A recent decision of the German Supreme
Court has emphasized that German courts should
follow the EPO approach and require that the inventive step constitute a technical contribution (p. 10).
Japan. Japanese law and practice with respect to
both software and business method patents are usually described as being similar to the EPO’s, with both
standing in contrast to the American situation. For
example, the background material to the EU’s proposed directive on computer-implemented inventions
states that “in Europe there has to be a technical
contribution provided by the invention. In Japan
there is a doctrine which has traditionally been interpreted in a similar way: the invention has to be a
highly advanced creation of technical ideas by which
a law of nature is utilized” (Comm. of the EC 2002, 5).
Japan has no outright ban on either software or
business method patents. On the contrary, with
respect to business methods the stated policy of the
Japanese Patent Office (JPO) is “to offer appropriate protection of intellectual property rights (IPRs)
in this field under close cooperation with overseas
national patent offices” (JPO 2000). The JPO examines business methods applications under the category of “Computer Software-Related Inventions.”
It issued highly detailed new Examination
Guidelines for such inventions on December 28,
2000.8 These new guidelines suggest that business
method claims (at least those that are implemented
by computers) may pass the statutory subject matter test almost as easily as they do in the United
States but that the inventive step scrutiny will
approximate that in the EPO.
According to the new JPO guidelines, business
method claims face three major hurdles: statutory
subject matter, the requirement that inventions be
“clearly stated,” and inventive step. To meet the
subject matter requirement of “a creation of technical ideas utilizing a law of nature,” a business method

7. Two recent EPO board decisions concerning software, both captioned International Business Machines Corporation, have
further complicated this issue (T 1173/97 [1998] and T935/97 [1999]). Both involved claims drawn to “a computer program
product.” In both, after long and convoluted discussion of the nature of technical character, the board remitted the application back to the examiners to continue the search for this elusive prey. Both patents ultimately issued; there were some modifications, but both still contained computer program product claims.
8. These guidelines are available at the JPO’s Web site at <www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/index.htm>.
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or other software-related invention must be “concretely realized by using hardware resources” (p. 11).
The JPO’s examples of business method claims that
meet this standard include “a storing method of
articles distributed via network” (p. 33), “a computer
program for predicting daily sales of commodities”
(p. 36), and “a service method for offering service
points depending on an amount of commodity purchased in telephone shopping” (p. 43). These examples suggest that it makes no difference whether a
business method claim is drawn to the method of
providing the service or the implementing software.
The requirement that an invention be “clearly
stated” is—ironically if not unexpectedly—not very

The substantial rhetorical gap between the
United States on the one hand and Europe and
Japan on the other concerning the patentability
of business methods might not be so profound
in practice.

clear. The following is an example of a claim that
comes up short: “an order-receiving method using a
computer, comprising the steps of . . .” (p. 4). The
problem with this claim is that it is unclear whether
it is to be construed “as an order-receiving method
(by a human) using a computer as a mere calculation tool” or “as an information processing method
by computer software in the constructed orderreceiving system” (p. 5). A claim to “a program
equipped with an order-receiving means to accept a
commodity order from a customer” is said to be
similarly flawed but easily curable by amendment to
“a program to make the computer operate as an
order-receiving means” (p. 5). On balance, though
this issue receives substantial attention in the new
guidelines, it seems to be little more than a technical challenge to Japanese patent lawyers.
The inventive step question is far more substantive. The basic concept is very much like the U.S.
nonobviousness standard: whether “a person skilled
in the art could easily have arrived at a claimed
invention based on cited inventions” (p. 15). As in
the United States, the claimed invention is to be
viewed as a whole. The JPO guidelines then offer
extended examples of inventions that will fail the
inventive step test; two categories are especially
relevant to business methods. The first is the application of existing knowledge to other fields. For
28

example, “[w]here there exists the cited invention
of ‘medical information retrieval system’, to apply
the concrete means for retrieving in said ‘medical
information retrieval system’ to a ‘commodity information retrieval system’ is deemed to be within the
ordinary creative activity of a person skilled in the
art” (p. 16). This example appears to involve the
same general category of invention as the EPO’s
Sohei decision, where the Boards of Appeal found
patentable subject matter but left open the question of inventive step.
The second noninventive category is the “systematization of human transactions,” in which “the cited
prior art describes human transactions but not how
to systematize them” (p. 17). Business examples
include “[m]erely to replace a telephone or fax previously used in order to receive orders from customers
with a home page on the Internet,” and “[m]erely to
change the way of managing a classified section in a
magazine into a way of managing such information via
the home page on the Internet” (p. 17). These examples are reminiscent of the patent in dispute in the
Amazon.com v. barnesandnoble.com case in the
United States. The USPTO had issued the patent, but
the Federal Circuit was dubious whether it would
hold up under novelty and nonobviousness scrutiny.
The overall import of these inventive step examples
seems to be that the JPO will unequivocally oppose
patents that lie in a gray area in the United States and
maybe even in the EPO.
Whatever the theoretical distinctions, there is
evidence that the JPO’s results do not differ materially from those reached by the USPTO. At a meeting in Japan in the summer of 2000, the “Trilateral
Offices” (the JPO, the USPTO, and the EPO) carried out an interesting experiment (Trilateral
Technical Meeting 2000). The JPO and the USPTO
examined several sets of hypothetical business
method claims. Despite some differences in their
respective approaches to statutory subject matter,
the two offices resolved the issues of novelty and
inventive step in virtually identical fashion and,
consequently, arrived at the same results on the
ultimate issue of patentability. All three Trilateral
Offices concluded that their practices reflect consensus on two issues: “that a technical aspect is
necessary for a computer-implemented business
method to be eligible for patenting” and that “to
merely automate a known human transaction
process using well known automation techniques is
not patentable” (Trilateral Technical Meeting
2000). With respect to the first point, a footnote
observed that the USPTO permits the technical
aspect to be implicit in the claim, whereas the EPO
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and the JPO require it to be explicit. With respect to
the second, one wonders why the USPTO did not
have it mind when it allowed Amazon.com’s oneclick on-line shopping patent. In any event, in light
of this experiment, it is not surprising that one leading American source concludes that the JPO
“appears to be following the lead of State Street in
permitting patents on business methods” (Merges
and Duffy 2002, 174).
Status of business methods under TRIPS. As
noted in the introductory section, Article 27 of TRIPS
requires WTO member countries to grant patents on
“products or processes, in all fields of technology,
provided that they are new, involve an inventive
step and are capable of industrial application.” Such
patents must be granted, moreover, “without discrimination as to . . . the field of technology.” The question
has been raised whether these provisions amount to
a command that WTO nations recognize business
method patents or risk trade sanctions from those
that do (Taketa 2002, 964–67).
This very argument was raised by the appellant
in the EPO Boards of Appeal’s 1998 IBM decision
(see footnote 7), which dealt with a patent on a
“computer program product.” Interestingly, “[t]o a
large extent the Board share[d] the appellant’s opinion about the significance of TRIPS.” The problem,
however, was that the board, “for the time being,”
was “not convinced that TRIPS may be applied
directly to the EPC,” since it is an agreement among
individual states. Despite its unwillingness to apply
TRIPS directly, the board thought it “appropriate to
take it into consideration.” The board concluded
“that it is the clear intention of TRIPS . . . not to
exclude programs for computers as mentioned in
and excluded under Article 52(2)(c) EPC.” TRIPS,
in other words, seems to require a State Street rule
of patentable subject matter.
This is a rather startling statement: The EPC and
TRIPS are in direct conflict. Presumably, if TRIPS
did apply directly to the EPO, Article 52(2)(c)
would be invalid and the EPO would have to adopt
the U.S. approach. It is not clear how this could
happen unless the EPC members were to decide to
adopt TRIPS directly; such a fundamental revision
of the EPC’s text through indirect means seems
unlikely at best. But in so-called monist countries,
where treaties such as TRIPS immediately become
part of national law, accession to TRIPS may already

(albeit stealthily) have effected the adoption of the
State Street regime.9 The effect of TRIPS, whether
direct or indirect, is a legal theme to be watched in
the coming years.

Future Legal Trends

U

SPTO: Trends, practices, and initiatives.
In March 2000, the USPTO announced a major
plan “to improve the quality of the examination
process in technologies related to electronic commerce and business methods” (USPTO 2000). In
a white paper issued in conjunction with this
announcement, the USPTO reviewed the history of
business method patents as well as current trends
and described several initiatives designed to add
examiners, improve their competence, provide better access to relevant prior art, and insure quality
control. Progress on these initiatives was the subject of a “Partnership Meeting” with USPTO “customers” in the summer of 2002 (USPTO 2002).
According to the white paper (USPTO 2000), the
trend that was already in progress before the State
Street decision has accelerated. For example, in Class
705 (data processing: financial, business practice,
or cost/price determination), the USPTO received
330 applications in 1995, 584 in 1996, 927 in 1997,
1,340 in 1998, 2,821 in 1999, 7,800 in 2000, and an
estimated 10,000 in fiscal year 2001. The number of
allowed patents, which, of course, will lag behind
applications, has also gone up steadily, from 203 in
1995 to 1,062 in 2000 although the most recent data
for fiscal year 2001 suggest that allowances will
drop into the 500 to 600 range. This drop is likely to
be the result of more examiners giving each application greater scrutiny. The number of examiners in
the work group that handles business method–related
applications has almost doubled over the last two
years, and those hired are said to have greater
expertise in both business and computer applications. In addition, examiners are being furnished
and encouraged to use wider resources for locating
potentially disabling nonpatent prior art.
All allowed applications in Class 705 are now
subjected to a second-level review “to ensure compliance with the mandatory search requirements,
clarity and completeness of reasons for allowance,
and to determine whether the scope of the claim
should be considered.” In addition, there is inprocess review of randomly selected pending

9. Civil law countries commonly follow the monistic approach. Most common law countries are “dualist,” meaning that national
implementing legislation is required. The United States is a hybrid: the supremacy clause of Article VI of the Constitution provides that “all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of
the Land,” but Congress regularly enacts implementing legislation (Taketa 2002, 960.)
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cases.10 Two measures of this heightened scrutiny
are that the average time from filing to first office
action (the initial notice of allowance and/or rejection of claims) in Class 705 is 23.5 months, versus
14.6 months for the entire USPTO, and that the
average time to final disposition is 28.5 months in
Class 705, versus 25.6 months for the entire USPTO
(USPTO 2001).
It is difficult for an outsider to discern qualitative
trends in the USPTO’s response to business method
patents. There is no reason to suspect that there
has been any rearguard action against State Street.
On the contrary, as noted earlier, the USPTO’s
Guidelines and Manual reflected skepticism about

In the end, economics may have more to say
than law about whether and when the business
method patent flood finally crests.

the vitality of the business method subject matter
exception even before State Street. Its more recent
documentation, both internal and external, is
entirely faithful to the Federal Circuit’s party line.
All evidence points to the USPTO’s much-publicized
heightened scrutiny being focused instead on the
categories of novelty and nonobviousness. Examiners
are being instructed—and are being given better
resources—to determine whether claimed applications really are new and nonobvious. The USPTO
has clearly recognized that traditional searches in
prior patents and professional literatures are inadequate to this task.
This recognition does not mean that inventors
have been—or are likely to be—deterred from filing
highly aggressive patents. Nor has the USPTO
ceased granting highly controversial patents. To
cite just one example, on October 1, 2002, Ed Pool,
owner of the one-room company DE Technologies,
Inc., obtained U.S. Patent No. 6,460,020 on a
“Universal Shopping Center for International
Operation.” The purpose of Pool’s system is to provide “a pre-transactional calculation of all charges
involved in any international transaction,” including
currency conversions, customs duties, freight, and
insurance. The system is intended to do all the
related paperwork electronically, in a language of
the customer’s choosing. Even before the patent
30

issued, commentators speculated that it might be
worth $2.4 billion in license fees from major
Internet businesses; one predicted that “the patent
will undoubtedly add to the uproar over business
method patent policy” (Cronin 2000).
U.S. legislative prospects. The limits on
enforcement of business method patents contained
in the American Inventors Protection Act of 1999
have not satisfied some members of Congress.
Subsequent sessions have seen the introduction of
bills intended to impose even tighter restrictions.
None has yet succeeded. Interestingly, the preferred approach has been not to attack State Street
directly but to make the examination procedure
more rigorous. Both H.R. 5634, the “Business
Method Improvement Act of 2000” (106th Cong., 2d
sess.), and H.R. 1322, the “Business Method
Improvement Act of 2001” (107th Cong., 1st sess.),
sought to give third parties and the public an
enhanced opportunity to oppose business method
patents as well as to raise the bar for novelty and
nonobviousness. Both expired at the House subcommittee stage.
At the other extreme, some members of the
patent bar have begun to argue for legislation to
enhance enforceability. One recent article, for
example, has pointed out that a U.S. business
method patentee may be without a remedy under
existing law “when the infringer has located part of
the claimed process outside of the United States”
and suggests ways in which Congress might “tweak
the law” (Connor and Leak 2002, 1, 3). Even the
authors concede, however, that there is no indication and little likelihood that Congress will act.
Future U.S. judicial issues. The Federal
Circuit’s opinion dissolving the preliminary injunction in the Amazon.com case (discussed earlier)
may be the best predictor of future battles in the
courts. The Federal Circuit focused not on the
patentable subject matter issue but rather on novelty and nonobviousness. This is likely to be the pattern in cases to come: The subject matter issue has
been laid to rest, and litigants will argue over how to
apply Sections 102 and 103 in the business method
field. One particular area to watch will be how the
courts respond to the USPTO’s increasing attention
to nonpatent prior art. In most fields, novelty and
nonobviousness litigation has focused overwhelmingly on previous patents. Relatedly, the USPTO has
been making increasing use of “officially noted”
subject matter to reject business method patents on
novelty nonobviousness grounds. This subject matter, which does not involve statutory categories of
prior art (other patents, printed publications, etc.)
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at all, consists of “examples capable of instant and
verifiable recognition, such as ATM machines”
(USPTO 2002). Its relevance to business method
applications is self-evident. As there is only limited
case law dealing with officially noted subject matter
(USPTO 2002), the judicial response will bear
watching here as well.
Enforcement is another area in which de facto
judicial limits on business method patents could
emerge. Patent lawyers are sometimes heard to say
that “what the Federal Circuit giveth on patentability, it taketh away on enforcement.” They mean
that, since its inception in 1983, the Federal Circuit
has tended to be more expansive than the “secular”
courts in allowing patents (see State Street, for
example) but somewhat stingier in its willingness
to find infringement.11 The Supreme Court has
contributed to this trend in recent years with two
decisions that have narrowed the “doctrine of equivalents” (Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis
Chemical Co., 520 U.S. 17 [1997]; Festo Corp. v.
Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S.
Ct. 1831 [2002]). This old, judicially created rule,
whose purpose is to catch infringers who do not literally copy the patented invention, has shrunk
almost to the point of disappearance. Perhaps this
relative stinginess will creep into business method
patent litigation.
A test of this hypothesis may be forthcoming. As
noted in the previous section, some patent lawyers
are suggesting that infringers may be able to take
advantage of loopholes in the existing remedial section of the Patent Act (35 U.S.C. § 271) by conducting portions of their activities outside the United
States (Connor and Leak 2002). Some lawyers also
suggest that the Federal Circuit might close those
loopholes by aggressive construction of the act. We
will know more if and when these loopholes begin to
be litigated.
EU initiatives. Within the European Union, two
ongoing developments are noteworthy. First, the
creation of a true EU patent continues to be a major
priority. Motivated by concerns about the transaction costs of the EPO’s national patent bundle
scheme, as well as the inconsistencies that can
result from national enforcement, the European
Commission proposed the creation of a Community

Patent in July 2000. In a May 2002 speech (EU
2002), EU Internal Market Commissioner Frits
Bolkestein indicated that although “the Council has
made progress on making such a Community Patent
a reality,” there were still substantial roadblocks in
the form of “the interests of a small number of specialists, judges, and lawyers that currently work in
national patent courts.” However, press reports in
March 2003 indicated that the EU ministers had
reached a compromise on these remaining issues,
paving the way to finalization of the EU patent.
At the same time, the EU Commission has presented a proposal for a Directive on the Patentability
of Computer-Implemented Inventions (Comm. of the
EC 2002). If adopted by the European Parliament and
Council, commission directives require the harmonization of member state laws in accordance with
their contents. The overall thrust of this directive is
to solve the inconsistent enforcement problem by
requiring the adoption of the EPC standards as the
national law of the EU member states.
Under the current official text of the proposed
directive, computer-implemented inventions are “considered to belong to a field of technology” (Art. 3).
Like other inventions, they must meet the traditional
European standards of industrial application, novelty,
and inventive step. In order to meet the inventive
step requirement, a computer-implemented invention “must make a technical contribution” (Art. 4[2]).
This requirement means that the nonobvious contribution to the art must be in a technical area, whether
it lies in the underlying problem, the solution, or the
effects of the solution. Significantly, “if there is no
technical contribution, e.g., if the contribution to
the state of the art lies wholly in non-technical
aspects, as would be the case if the contribution to
the state of the art comprised purely a method of
doing business, there will be no patentable subject
matter” (p. 14 [Explanation of the Directive: Article 4]). Nonetheless, if the technical contribution
requirement is met, the claim “may comprise both
technical and non-technical features” (Art. 4[3]),
meaning that the scope of the patent will not be limited to the technical contribution. The EU approach is
consistent with the EPC, EPO Guidelines, and cases
such as Sohei, which prohibit the patenting of business methods “as such” but find an ultimate business

10. At the 2002 Partnership Meeting, a participant asked why there was no second-level review of disallowed applications: Is the
USPTO “telling examiners that they can do low quality examination for cases they do not want to allow?” (USPTO 2002).
The USPTO’s response was to cite the random in-process review initiative.
11. See, for example, Wang Laboratories, Inc. v. America Online, Inc. (197 F.3d 1377 [Fed. Cir. 1999]), in which the court
narrowly construed the claims in a software-based invention so as to affirm a lower court finding of no infringement. The
Federal Circuit also declined to apply the doctrine of equivalents, discussed in the text above.
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method objective to be irrelevant so long as the
claimed invention is suitably technical in character.
UKPO review. Like its counterparts in the
United States and Japan, the UKPO has recently
reviewed its policies concerning business method
patents (UKPO 2001). Its request for consultation
with its various constituencies produced 285 formal
submissions by both individuals and organizations
and 11,000 Web site hits. Not surprisingly, “[t]here
was no consensus among respondents on how far
software ought to be patentable” (¶11). With respect
to software, the UKPO’s position was “to reaffirm
the principle that patents are for technological
innovations. Software should not be patentable
where there is no technological innovation, and
technological innovations should not cease to be
patentable merely because the innovation lies in
software” (¶19). This conclusion seems consistent
with the EPO position and, arguably, somewhat
more restrictive than the State Street rule. With
respect to business methods, the UKPO concluded
that those advocating patentability “have not provided the necessary evidence that it would be likely
to increase innovation. Unless and until that evidence is available, ways of doing business should
remain unpatentable” (¶24). The latter position is
consistent with that taken by the British courts. It is
thus less favorable to patents than the position
taken by the EPO and, of course, the USPTO and
the U.S. Federal Circuit.

Conclusion
here is at present a substantial rhetorical gap
between the United States on the one hand and
Europe and Japan on the other concerning the
patentability of business methods. Under the State
Street decision, business methods clearly constitute
patentable subject matter. Europe and Japan, with
their “technical character” requirement, see themselves (as reflected in their official literatures) as

T
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imposing significant barriers to patentability both at
the subject matter and inventive step stages of the
examination. They view the United States as having
come down strongly and perhaps irrevocably in
favor of ready patentability. The EU, for example,
has characterized the United States as a “test case,”
conducting a potentially dangerous experiment
with its “negligible” restrictions on business method
patents (Comm. of the EC 2002, 5).
The theme that emerges from this paper, however,
is that the differences that seem so striking at the theoretical level might not be so profound in practice.
While the Federal Circuit has forced the USPTO
to renounce subject matter objections to business
method patents (something it was probably on the
way to doing anyway), the USPTO has taken significant steps to scrutinize novelty and nonobviousness
more rigorously. In its Amazon.com decision, the
Federal Circuit showed an inclination to do the same.
Thus, while the American patent system may be perceived abroad as having given a blank check to business method applicants, the reality may prove to be
considerably more restrictive.
Europe and Japan, by contrast, may in practice be
somewhat more liberal than their policy pronouncements would indicate. In the EPO, cases such as
Sohei and the two IBM decisions suggest that the
technical character barrier might be a matter more
of form than substance, at least at the subject matter stage. And in Japan, the trilateral experiment
revealed no differences with the United States in
examination outcomes. Although the inventive step
distinction remains material, the eventual outcome
may nonetheless be convergence, with the United
States turning out to be permissive in theory but
perhaps demanding in practice, while Europe and
Japan display precisely the opposite tendency. In
the end, economics may have more to say than law
about whether and when the business method
patent flood finally crests.
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